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Abstract This paper analyzes incentive problems caused by international
risk sharing. They arise because international risk sharing contributes to the
insuranceofdomesticconsumptionandthuslowersgovernments’incentivesto
increase output. We show that the resulting distortions can lead to substantial
efﬁciency losses. Complete risk sharing is, therefore, undesirable and the opti-
mal degree of risk sharing may be low. Furthermore, we show that households’
risk sharing decisions are socially inefﬁcient and are effectively maximizing
government moral hazard. As a result, ﬁnancial innovation and integration
may reduce welfare by increasing households’ risk sharing opportunities.




Portfolio theory suggests that in order to minimize consumption variability,
risks should be completely pooled across countries. Therefore, it is typically
taken for granted that facilitating international risk sharing is desirable and
that a lack of such risk sharing indicates inefﬁciencies. The main theme of
this paper is that there is also a potential cost to international risk sharing.
This is because, by lowering a country’s beneﬁts from its output, international
risk sharing reduces the country’s incentives to produce and thus may cause
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inefﬁcient government behavior. Hence, there is a trade-off between risk
sharing and incentives, similar to the one that arises in a domestic context.
The aim of this paper is to contribute to the understanding of this trade-
off. This is an important objective, because, ﬁrst, if international risk sharing
causes distortions in production, complete risk sharing may be sub-optimal.
Such a result may help to understand the small degree of risk sharing across
countries, which has been pointed out by several authors. For example, only
around 5% of income shocks in OECD countries are insured (Sørensen and
Yosha 1998) compared to the 100% income insurance that portfolio theory
would suggest. Up to now, no widely accepted resolution for this international
risk sharing puzzle exists.1
Second, the analysis may inform about whether households’ risk sharing
choices are socially optimal and whether there is a case for government
intervention. Earlier work has found that in a closed economy markets solve
the risk sharing-incentive trade-off in an efﬁcient way (Kocherlakota 1998;
Calcagno and Wagner 2006), but this result may not extend to an international
setting.
We show that when households can trade assets that condition on output,
equilibrium risk sharing is characterized by output diversiﬁcation in perpetuity.
Under such risk sharing, domestic households hold claims to world output in
all future periods and have sold claims to the output of their own country.
This form of risk sharing is particularly problematic for government incentives.
First, it does not allow for the costs of production to be shared among
countries. Since at the same time a country’s beneﬁts from production are
reduced to the extent that it is diversiﬁed, governments have an incentive to
lower inputs into production. This may be either directly (for example,through
reduced public investment) or indirectly, by discouraging households from
supplying inputs (for example by taxing labor). Second, because households’
optimal risk sharing involves diversiﬁcation of perpetual claims to output
(otherwise they would not be insured against permanent shocks), a country
does not suffer any future costs from inefﬁcient policies, which would normally
helptomitigatemoralhazardissues.Forexample,ifgovernmentpoliciescause
an outﬂow of capital that results in lower domestic income in future periods,
the country would not internalize this as claims to its income are held by
households from other countries.
We also show that equilibrium risk sharing is inefﬁcient from a social
perspective. The reason for this is that an individual household ignores the
impact of its risk sharing decision on government policies.2 Therefore, it does
not obtain risk sharing that is less detrimental to incentives, even if this
would be possible. Suppose, for example, that besides assets conditioning on
1For an overview over the substantial literature on this puzzle, see Lewis (1999).
2This is due to a ‘common-agency’ problem (as analyzed in the international context by Tirole
2002, 2003): the government acts as a common agent for domestic households. By inﬂuencing the
behavior of the common agent, a single household poses externalities for the other households in
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output, all domestic production inputs could also be traded. Complete risk
sharing could then be obtained without creating any incentive problems by
diversifying a country’s net income (that is, output net of costs), as the costs of
providing inputs would then be shared with foreigners. However, an individual
household has no incentive to obtain such complex risk sharing, as output
diversiﬁcation already achieves complete risk sharing.
To illustrate the magnitude of the incentive problems, we show that the
potentialcostsofgovernmentmoralhazardcanbelarge.Inparticular,theycan
easily outweigh the gains from risk sharing and can cause the optimal degree
of risk sharing to be low. Therefore, the low degree of risk sharing in the data
does not necessarily indicate an inefﬁcient level of risk sharing.
Another implication of our analysis is that ﬁnancial integration and ﬁnancial
innovation that allow for better risk sharing may reduce welfare. This is
because they may facilitate risk sharing beyond the socially optimal level.3
Recently, so-called Economic Derivatives have been introduced (see, for
example, The Economist 2002). These instruments allow individuals to hedge
country risks, for example, by trading a country’s GDP. While this innovation
surely brings about considerable gains by improving diversiﬁcation, our results
indicate that it may also imply signiﬁcant costs.
The concern that international risk sharing may entail costs by causing
inefﬁcient government policies is not a new one (see Shiller 1993; Wincoop
1999;D r è z e 2000). However, there has not been a formal analysis of such
costs yet. This paper contributes in particular by studying how they trade-
off with the beneﬁts from international risk sharing and by considering the
consequences for the optimal degree of risk sharing.
Several papers have analyzed the implications of moral hazard for the
pattern of risk sharing and capital ﬂows across countries. In Gertler and
Rogoff (1990), moral hazard on the side of the government can explain why
capital may ﬂow from poorer to richer countries, even though rates of return
in the latter are lower. Atkeson (1991) has shown that capital outﬂows in
a crisis can be an efﬁcient outcome (even though suboptimal in terms of
risk sharing), when risk sharing is impeded by moral hazard and a lack of
contract enforcement. Tirole (2003) uses government moral hazard to explain
the structure of external ﬁnancing in developing countries. These papers study
the pattern of risk sharing that a benevolent social planner would implement.
By contrast, the point of departure in the present paper is risk sharing that
is initiated by households. We analyze how such risk sharing interacts with
government incentives and show that it has very different welfare implications.
While this paper is concerned with distortions in production in general,
several previous contributions have suggested speciﬁc channels through which
inefﬁciencies can arise, mostly in the context of cross-ownership of assets
3It has been argued that ﬁnancial integration also disciplines governments by making capital
more sensitive to macroeconomic policies (e.g., Fischer 1998). Our analysis suggests that such a
disciplining effect may be mitigated because ﬁnancial integration also facilitates risk sharing and
thus insulates a country from the consequences of capital outﬂows following bad policies.580 W. Wagner
rather than explicitly risk sharing. Examples are distortions in corporate gov-
ernance and bankruptcy laws (Tirole 2003), in crisis prevention (Tirole 2002,
2003), in labor protection (Atkeson 1991), in the taxation of ﬁrms (Huizinga
and Nielsen 1997), in public inputs (Sachs 1989), in the incentives to undertake
economic reforms (Calvo 2000), and in debt service (Kremer and Mehta 2000).
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. In the next section,
we demonstrate the moral hazard problem that arises from international risk
sharing. Section 3 examines the equilibrium of household risk sharing and gov-
ernment policies. In Section 4 we discuss some mechanisms that may in prac-
tice help to mitigate government moral hazard. Section 5 studies the optimal
degree of output diversiﬁcation and analyzes the connection to the observed
lack of international risk sharing. The ﬁnal section contains the conclusions.
2 International risk sharing and domestic production
The world consists of a continuum of ex-ante identical countries, indexed with
i. Each country is inhabited by a continuum of households, indexed with j.
There is only one period. Households maximize expected utility E[u(c i
j)],
where c i
j denotes consumption. Production by household j in country i is
given by
y i
j = f(x i
j)ηi (1)
where ηi is a country-speciﬁc shock giving rise to a risk sharing motive (we
abstract here from household speciﬁc uncertainty; one may imagine that such
uncertainty is already completely shared within a country). x i
j is an arbitrary
input to production, which is either chosen by households or the government.
The interpretation of x i
j is broad. Besides private inputs (e.g., capital and
labor) and public inputs (e.g., infrastructure) it may, for example, also stand
for efforts to undertake economic reforms that raise output. The supply of
these inputs causes costs z(x i
j), which are expressed in terms of output (e.g., if
x refers to capital in the form of the output good, then z(x) = x). Furthermore,
we assume standard regularity conditions that ensure interior solutions to
the input choice: f (x)>0, f  (x)<0,limx↓0 f (x) =∞and z (x)>0,z  (x) ≥
0,limx↓0 z (x) = 0.
We assume, moreover, that international risk sharing is characterized by
output diversiﬁcation (in the next section we endogenize the risk sharing
decision and show that such output diversiﬁcation is indeed the preferred
choice of households). Analogous to portfolio diversiﬁcation, output diversi-
ﬁcation can be achieved through selling claims to domestic output and buying
claims to world output (the equivalent of the world market portfolio). Denote
with b (0 ≤ b ≤ 1) the share of domestic production diversiﬁed. Households’
consumption is then given by
c i
j = y(x i
j) − z(x i
j) + b(y∗ − y) (2)International risk sharing and government moral hazard 581
where y and y∗ denote domestic and world output (expressed in per capita
terms), respectively. Obviously, for a given x i
j an increase in b is welfare
increasing because it reduces consumption risk. For b = 1, one obtains the
standard full risk sharing allocation: c i
j = y∗ − z∗, implying that consumption
is ex-post equalized across countries (follows from Eq. 2, after imposing
symmetry: x i
j = x and zi = z).
Consider ﬁrst the optimal choice of inputs by households. From Eq. 2,t h e







which would imply an efﬁcient choice of xi
t and hence there would be no dis-
tortions in production. Consider next the choice of inputs by the government
of country i. From integrating Eq. 2 over jand applying symmetry we have the
budget equation of country i
ci = (1 − b)y(xi) + by∗ − z(xi) (4)
Hence, for a government that maximizes domestic welfare, the ﬁrst order
condition for xi is
(1 − b)E[u (ci)y (xi)]=E[u (ci)z (xi)] (5)
Thus, in contrast to households, the government perceives lower beneﬁts of xi
and hence chooses an xi lower than the efﬁcient level. This is because it takes
into account that for the country as a whole, a share b of domestic output is
insured, while the cost of supplying inputs is still fully borne by the residents.
Alternatively, Eq. 5 is also obtained if households choose x i
j but gov-
ernments can inﬂuence households’ incentives to supply inputs. To see this,
suppose for example that the government can levy a tax ti on production.
Analogous to Eqs. 2 and 3, the household’s budget equation and ﬁrst order
condition can be expressed as
c i
j = (1 − ti)y(x i
j) − z(x i
j) + b(y∗ − yi) (6)
(1 − ti)E[u (c)y (xi)]=E[u (c)y (zi)] (7)
By setting ti = b, the government can then implement its ﬁrst order condition
(5). Summarizing, we can hence conclude that
Result 1 Output diversiﬁcation leads to distortions in all production inputs
that can, directly or indirectly, be controlled by the government.
Anecdotalevidencesupportstheexistenceofdistortinggovernmentpolicies
due to risk sharing (or, similarly, due to cross-ownership of assets). For
example, it has been argued that Canadian provinces have raised their labor
taxes because a federal unemployment insurance system allowed them to shift
part of the costs of tax increases (arising from higher unemployment) to the
federalgovernment(CourcheneandPurvis1993).Inoursetup,unemployment
insurance would correspond to insurance (or ‘foreign ownership’) of the labor
income of a provence. As labor income constitutes a part of total income,582 W. Wagner
incentives to raise the latter are reduced. Consequently, it may be optimal for
the government to raises taxes on inputs (however, as only the labor income
part is insured, it is more efﬁcient to levy taxes directly on labor in order to
avoid distortions in other inputs).
Furthermore, in the aftermath of the Asian crises, commentators have held
foreign ownership of debt and equity responsible for delays in reforms in the
affected countries. Debt and equity can be understood as a claims to domestic
capital income and thus their foreign ownership leads to partial insurance
of capital income. Hence, incentives to provide effort in raising output (of
which capital income is a part) through a reform are reduced.
There is also econometric evidence consistent with government policies
causing production distortions due to foreign ownership of assets: Eijfﬁnger
and Wagner (2001) provide panel evidence from US states that higher foreign
ownershipofﬁrmsleadstohighercapitaltaxes.HuizingaandNicodème(2006)
ﬁnd similar evidence for capital taxes on the ﬁrm level for the EU.4
3 Risk sharing and production in equilibrium
In this section, we endogenize households’ risk sharing choices. Households
can now freely trade securities internationally and also fully anticipate possible
distortions in the inputs by governments. Furthermore, we extend to an inﬁnite
horizon setting, where risk sharing, the choice of inputs and consumption take
place in every period. The government’s choice of inputs in a period can then
have consequences for households’ consumption in future periods. This would
allow, in principal, for the mitigation of government moral hazard through
reputation mechanisms or the threat of capital ﬂight.
To focus on the core issues, we refrain from modelling household produc-
tion explicitly. Rather, we directly assume that households have a claim to
aggregate output net of its cost and that the production input is set by the
government (since private inputs are set efﬁciently regardless of risk sharing






t), respectively. t (t = 0,1,2,...) denotes time. The single input xi
t is





t are drawn independently across countries from
the per-period density-function φt(ηi
t), which has full support on (0,∞).T h i s
speciﬁcation ensures two properties. First, from independence across countries
and the assumption of full support in every period, it follows that two shocks
are never fully correlated, neither across countries nor across time. Second,
from full support we have that for each f(x i
j)>0 each realization of output yi
t
4An example that vividly demonstrates that governments are taking non-residents into consider-
ation when setting their policies comes from US state taxation: all US states tax hotel and motel
occupancy (which are disproportionally used by out-of-state residents) at a higher rate than the
general sales tax (Pollock 1991).International risk sharing and government moral hazard 583
on (0,∞) is possible. Hence, one cannot deduce the input xi
t from observing yi
t
(which would do away with the moral hazard problem).
At t = 0, households can trade the complete set of securities that are con-
tingent on output. More speciﬁcally, for each period t and for each realization
of past outputs {y≤t} (that is a realization of all countries’ outputs up to period
t), there is a security that pays off one unit of output in t when the output
realization was {y≤t} and zero otherwise. We denote the quantity of output
security {y≤t} held by a household at time t by q i
j,t({y≤t}) and its price by
pt({y≤t}).
Note that the restriction to output contracts is important. If either shocks,
inputs or costs were contractible, it is easy to see that the ﬁrst best could be in
principal attained as full risk sharing would then be possible without distorting
production incentives. The motivation for restricting us to output contracts is
that country shocks, production inputs and the costs of providing inputs are
too complex to write contracts on (they may even not be observable). Such
contracts are also not commonly observed in practice. On the other hand,
output contracts can be based on a single observable variable and are already
traded (see Remark 1 below). Moreover, we argue later (Remark 6) that even
if such contracts are available, they are not used in equilibrium.
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j,t({y≤t}) = 0 (10)
whereEq.9isahousehold’sconsumptionequationforeachperiodt andEq.10
its budget restriction for trade at t = 0.
At each t, governments (independently) choose inputs in order to maximize



















j,t({y≤t}) = 0 (12)
The timing can be summarized as follows. At t = 0, households trade
securities, i.e., choose the q i
j,t’s. Afterwards, at each t governments choose
inputs xi
t, the shocks ηi
t realize and households consume c i
j,t.584 W. Wagner
Proposition 1 In equilibrium,
(1) Households obtain complete risk sharing: u (c i
j,t) is constant across
individuals,









(1) In equilibrium, households rationally anticipate government policies {x}.
Furthermore, since households are atomistic they take {x} as given.





t). The household’s ﬁrst order condition





jπ({y≤t}) = 0 (13)
where λi
j is the Lagrange-multiplier associated with budget equa-





j,t) (and thus c i
j,t) is constant across households.
(2) From (1) it follows that c i
j,t = c∗
t ,w h e r ec∗
t is (per capita) world
consumption. Since var(c∗
t ) = 0 (follows by the law of large numbers
from the independence of ηi
t across countries) ⇒ var(c i
j,t) = 0.S i n c e
var(ηi
t)>0 and shocks are by assumption not fully correlated (neither





t + C i
j,t,w h e r eC i
j,t is some constant. Thus, ∂c i
j,t/∂yi 
t  = 0 for
arbitrary i,i , j,t,t  (note that this is not true if there are shocks that are
perfectly correlated: var(c i
j,t) = 0 can then be obtained through securities
paying off contingent on output other than yi























where the second term follows from suppressing index j because of












































lope theorem for xi
s, s ≥ t + 1)a n dEt[Et+1[·]] = Et[·] (law of iterated
expectations), Eq. 15 simpliﬁes to z (xi
t) = 0.    International risk sharing and government moral hazard 585
The intuition behind Proposition 1 is as follows. (1): A single household
behaves atomistically and takes domestic output, domestic cost, and security
prices as given. Therefore, its objective is reduced to minimizing consumption
variability. Hence, it chooses full risk sharing (2): Since shocks are not fully
correlated (and no contracts can be written on shocks), the only way for house-
holds to hedge completely against domestic shocks (in order to obtain full risk
sharing) is to sell output securities that fully offset their claim to domestic
output. (3): As a consequence of (2), domestic output for all future periods is
effectively sold at t = 0. A government can then not inﬂuence domestic gross
income (i.e., domestic output plus payments from the securities) anymore.
However, domestic consumption still fully depends on domestic costs (which
are, by assumption, not tradeable), hence the government chooses the inputs
in order to minimize these costs.
Another way to understand the independence of domestic gross income
from government actions is the following. Suppose, to the contrary, that
a government could affect a household’s income, say ∂vk
s /∂xi




s is a household’s gross income) for some i,k and s,t. Then, vk
s
would depend on yi
t (from Eq. 9 we have dvs
k/dxi
t  = 0 ⇒ ∂vs
k/∂yi
t  = 0). But this
implies that vk
s also depends on ηi
t (from Eq. 9: ∂vs
k/∂yi
t  = 0 ⇒ ∂vs
k/∂ηi
t  = 0),
contradicting full risk sharing.
Remark 1 (Equilibrium asset positions) From the proof of (2) we have
q i
j,t({y≤t}) =− yi
t + C i
j,t. Integrating over i and j and using C i
j,t = Ct (since
countries are ex-ante identical) and Eq. 12 gives Ct = y∗
t ,w h e r ey∗
t is world




holds’ asset positions are simple diversiﬁcation securities: households sell
claims to domestic output and buy claims to world output. Such contracts
are feasible since the recent introduction of Economic Derivatives which,
among others, allow to trade forwards on GDP (see The Economist, October
19th, 2002).
Remark 2 (One-period securities) Trading output securities in each period
that pay off in the next period (instead of trading the complete set at t = 0)
does not change the equilibrium outcome. The reason is that households can
use these securities to replicate the complete set of securities (see, e.g., Magill
and Quinzii 1998).
Remark 3 (Timing)Theresultsarenotsensitivetotheassumptionthatatt = 0
asset trade takes place before the government sets the input for the period.
To see this, suppose to the contrary that the government moves ﬁrst in t = 0.
Then, inputs would be set efﬁciently in this period, as domestic households
would suffer from any inefﬁciencies through a lower price they can obtain
when they sell domestic output (recall from Remark 1 that households trade
domestic output for world output). However, from t = 1 on, the moral hazard
problem is as before. This is because the potential presence of permanent
shocks requires households to insure output in perpetuity. Therefore, from586 W. Wagner
t = 1 on, the government ﬁnds the output in each current period already
insured (things would change, obviously, if the government could at t = 0
commit also to inputs for future periods; this possibility is discussed in the next
section).
Remark 4 (Costs of moral hazard that materialize in future periods) Govern-
ment moral hazard may be mitigated because an inefﬁcient choice of inputs
in the current period may have negative implications for future periods. For
example, inefﬁcient production in period t may trigger a capital ﬂight in period
t + 1, and reduce future income for the country. Although our setup allows for
such mechanisms because there is an inﬁnite horizon, they are not operative in
equilibrium (such mechanisms are discussed in more detail in the next section).
This is because full risk sharing requires output to be insured in perpetuity
(and not just in the current period). A country, therefore, does not suffer from
a lowering of its income in future periods.
Remark 5 (Inefﬁciency of equilibrium risk sharing) Because households
choose risk sharing without considering its social costs (which arise from dis-
tortions in aggregate production), the equilibrium allocation is (constrained)-
inefﬁcient. This result is diametrical to previous work (e.g. Kocherlakota 1998;
MagillandQuinzii2002).Inthesecontributionsmarketsforindividualproduc-
tion (as opposed to aggregate production) have been studied and were found
to operate efﬁciently in the presence of incentive problems. The reason for this
is that when a household sells claims to its own production, its incentives to
produce are reduced. This is anticipated by the buyer and internalized through
a lower price the household obtains for selling its own production. By contrast,
in the present setting, a household fails to internalize inefﬁciencies since they
arise for aggregate production and are thus equally borne by all households.
Remark 6 (Other securities) The assumption that only output securities are
tradeable can be relaxed without changing the equilibrium outcome. This is
because output securities sufﬁce to achieve full risk sharing. As households
ignore the impact of their risk sharing decision on aggregate incentives and
only strive for maximal risk sharing, there do not exist other securities that
are (individually) strictly preferred by households over output securities.
In particular, if other securities beside output securities can be traded (for
example, securities conditioning on inputs) but such securities do not allow for
fullrisksharing(forexample,becausenotallinputsarecontractibleorbecause
inputs can only be measured imprecisely), they are not used by households
(even though this may be socially desirable). The same holds if such securities
occur higher costs than output securities (for example, because of costly state
veriﬁcation or transaction costs), which is likely to be the case as output
securities only require conditioning on a single observable variable.
Remark 7 (Costly risk sharing) The extreme nature of Proposition 1 is a
consequence of the assumption that achieving full risk sharing is costless forInternational risk sharing and government moral hazard 587
households. Suppose to the contrary that there are some costs in obtaining risk





t (from Remark 1) because they are the most effective for
obtaining risk sharing. However, since risk sharing is now costly, households
may only obtain partial insurance. Rather than having ∂ci
t/∂yi
t = 0 (which
would be implied by full insurance) we may have, say, ∂ci
t/∂yi
t = (1 − bi
t) ≥ 0.
Note that this bi
t corresponds to the diversiﬁcation degree deﬁned in Eq. 4.
Since the government’s optimization problem is a static one (as households
trade securities q i
j,t(yi
t) that only depend on current but not past output), its
ﬁrst order condition can be expressed as (dropping the time subscript)
E[δtu (ci)(1 − b)]−E[δtu (ci)z (xi)]=0 (16)
which follows from Eq. 15 using ∂ci
t/∂yi
t = (1 − b). Equation 16 is identical
to Eq. 5. Hence, the government’s ﬁrst order condition in Section 2 can be
understood as applying to the per-period choice of inputs in a world with
multiple periods and costly risk sharing.
4 Factors limiting inefﬁciencies in government policies
Proposition 1 predicts that if households can trade securities that allow for
effective risk sharing across countries, they will insure domestic production
and motivate governments to choose inefﬁcient policies. In practice, there are
several mechanisms that may mitigate this government moral hazard. In this
section, we review some of them and argue that they are unlikely to overcome
inefﬁciencies in government policies.
Commitment Obviously, if governments can commit, the ﬁrst best is attain-
able simply by committing to the efﬁcient level of x (as deﬁned by Eq. 3).
However, governments have only an incentive to do so before risk sharing
takes place (otherwise, the previous section’s setup readily applies). An ef-
fective commitment seems also unfeasible because production inputs are not
always measurable or observable (think for example of human capital). It is
also unrealistic in that the government would need to commit to all policies
that affect inputs into the inﬁnite future in order to achieve the ﬁrst best.5
Reputational considerations Governments may be reluctant to lower inputs
because this may damage their reputation with foreigners. In Remark 5 we
have discussed that there is no reputation mechanism in our model, since
a country is fully insured against the negative repercussions that may arise
in terms of lower future income. Besides, there may also be reputational
spillovers to other external relationships the governmenthas and which are not
necessarily captured by our setup (such spillovers have been emphasized in the
sovereign risk literature, e.g., Eaton and Gersovitz 1981). However, the case
5Another problem is that such commitment may also not be desirable because it implies a loss of
ﬂexibility for countries in responding to shocks.588 W. Wagner
for such spillovers is not strong. This is because inefﬁcient policies are fully
anticipated and, therefore, priced into the securities. Hence, in equilibrium
foreign investors do not suffer from inefﬁcient government policies.
International mobility of capital Inefﬁcient inputs are likely to reduce the
return on capital. As a result, there may be a capital outﬂow, with potentially
negative repercussions for the country. For example, the capital outﬂow may
lead to a reduction in tax revenues or the return on labor. It has been
commonly asserted that this can exert a disciplining effect on governments
(e.g., Fischer 1998). As already discussed, due to households’ desire to iso-
late themselves from ﬂuctuations in their country’s income, a country will
be insured against such effects when effective means for international risk
sharing are available. Risk sharing may thus remove the discipline provided
by internationally mobile capital.
However, this only holds when risk sharing allows to insure all parts of
domestic income. If this is not the case (for example, because only capital
income can be insured), a country may suffer from a lower capital stock
through its impact on the uninsured parts of national income (e.g., lower tax
revenues and labor income). Therefore, our analysis cannot be readily applied
to the home bias in portfolio investment (French and Poterba 1991) if portfolio
diversiﬁcation is the main way through which international risk sharing takes
place.6
Inability of the government to inﬂuence inputs There are certainly restric-
tions in the government’s ability to inﬂuence production inputs, may it be
due to administrative, legal or political constraints. When this leads to inputs
being chosen by households, their provision will be efﬁcient (as shown in
Section2).However,indevelopedcountrieswith a functioningpoliticalsystem
and a functioning executive, governments have wide-ranging possibilities to
inﬂuence production inputs. For example, they can set tax rates, which in
turn determine household’s incentives to supply inputs. Or, governments can
introduce laws that govern the supply of inputs, for example through labor
laws that determine the number of weekly working hours. Governments also
set inputs in the public sector, which constitutes a large part of the economy in
developed countries. Thus, governments can probably control a large share of
overall inputs.
5 Optimal diversiﬁcation
In this section we analyze the socially optimal degree of output diversiﬁcation,
i.e., the degree of diversiﬁcation that maximizes households’ welfare when
incentive problems are present in the economy.
6To the contrary, evidence suggests that international risk sharing takes place through a variety of
channels rather than portfolio diversiﬁcation alone (e.g., Sørensen and Yosha 1998). Also, it has
been argued that the scope for additional risk sharing lies mainly in the sharing of labor income
risk (e.g., Shiller 1993).International risk sharing and government moral hazard 589
This degree does not necessarily coincide with socially optimal risk sharing,
i.e., there may be contracts that can improve upon the trade-off between
risk sharing and incentives. However, output diversiﬁcation is households’
preferred choice of risk sharing (as shown in Section 4) and therefore provides
a natural benchmark in a world where risk sharing is mainly achieved by
households. It is in particular useful to understand the welfare implications
of ﬁnancial innovation and integration through their impact on household risk
sharing. Output diversiﬁcation also translates directly into a degree of income
insurance, which is the common way of measuring the extent of risk sharing in
the data (see, for example, Sørensen and Yosha 1998).
We focus in this section on a single period. This is appropriate since, as
we have argued earlier (Remark 7), the optimization problem under output
diversiﬁcation is essentially a static one. We interpret x now as the aggregate
(or representative) input of the country, i.e., x refers to the combination of all
production inputs.
We assume that the supply of x in the economy is characterized by the
following equation
(1 − χb)E[u (c)y (x)]=E[u (c)z (x))] (17)
where we have suppressed the country indices. In Eq. 17, χ (0 ≤ χ ≤ 1)i sa
reduced form parameter that stands for the importance of factors that limit
moral hazard. In fact, from Eqs. 3 and 5 in Section 2 it can be appreciated that
Eq. 17 is a linear combination of the condition for the efﬁcient choice of x and
theconditionforthegovernment’schoiceof x(Eq. 5),withχ beingtherelative
weight on the latter.
We interpret Eq. 17 as the reduced form condition for the supply of x in an
economy where mitigating forces to government moral hazard (as described in
the previous section) are present. The motivation is the following. If mitigating
forces are absent, x is chosen according to Eq. 5, corresponding to χ = 1 in
Eq. 17. If the forces are partly effective, x will be chosen more efﬁciently,
which can be represented in Eq. 17 by a χ lower than one. In the case of fully
effective forces, x is chosen according to Eq. 3, corresponding to χ = 0. Hence,
varying degrees of effectiveness of the mitigating forces (in terms of reducing
government moral hazard) can be represented in Eq. 17 by varying χ between
zero and one.
The country-shock η is now assumed to have two components: an idiosyn-
cratic shock ε and an aggregate (world) shock ε∗. Both shocks have zero mean
and variances σ2 and σ∗2, respectively, and are assumed to be uncorrelated
with each other. The idiosyncratic shocks ε are also uncorrelated across coun-
tries. Hence, we can write η = 1 + ε + ε∗ and var(η) = σ2 + σ∗2. Domestic
output and world output are then given by y(x) = f(x)(1 + ε + ε∗) and y∗ =
f∗(1 + ε∗), respectively (the latter follows because the country-speciﬁc shocks
cancel out due to the law of large numbers).
For the coming analysis, it is useful to express consumption c in terms of its
certainty equivalent, denoted  c. The latter is deﬁned implicitly by E[u(c)]=590 W. Wagner
u( c). Denoting with c = E[c] expected consumption, c is approximately equal
to c − u  (c)/u (c) · var(c)/2 for when the variance of consumption is small




u  (c) f(k)
u (c)
(1 − b)2σ2 + σ∗2
2

f(k) − z(k) (18)
where we have made use of symmetry across countries, i.e., f(k) = f∗. Assum-
ing constant relative risk aversion and approximating the relative risk aversion
parameter γ by −u  (c) f(k)/u (c) yields




(1 − b)2σ2 + σ∗2

f(k) − z(k) (19)






(1 − b)2σ2 + σ∗2

(21)
is the risk premium for production. Using Eq. 20,E q .17 can be written as
(1 − χb)(1 − π)f (x) = z (x) (22)
The optimal degree of risk sharing b∗ is then the b that maximizes c subject
to Eq. 22. To understand its determinants, we consider the marginal welfare
effect of an increase in risk sharing (i.e., an increase in b by db)
 c (b) =− π (b) f(x) +[ (1 − π)f (x) − z (x)]x (b) (23)
z (x) can be substituted using Eq. 22 to yield
 c (b) =− π (b) f(x) + χb(1 − π)f (x)x (b)
=[ − π (b) + χb(1 − π)φf,b] f(x) (24)
where φ f,b = f (x)x (b)/f(x) is the semi-elasticity of production with respect
to the extent of risk sharing b.
The ﬁrst term in Eq. 24, −π (b)>0 (−π (b)>0 follows from Eq. 21),
represents the direct beneﬁts from risk sharing due to a lower risk premium.
The second term, χb(1 − π)φf,b, arises from the impact of diversiﬁcation on
production. Since 1 − π>0 (follows from Eq. 22), χb(1 − π) is positive for
χ>0,b > 0. Hence, additional production is welfare increasing (intuitively,
this is because there is underprovision of inputs for when χ>0,b > 0). The
welfare effect of the second term depends, therefore, on the sign of φ f,b,a n d
thus on x (b) as determined by Eq. 22.
From Eq. 22 we have that there are two effects of b on x.F i r s t ,a ni n c r e a s e
in b lowers the risk premium of production π, thus increasing the marginal
beneﬁts from additional production (the LHS of Eq. 22 increases). This causes
x to increase. The second effect arises because a higher b reduces the domesticInternational risk sharing and government moral hazard 591
beneﬁts of production and, therefore, production falls. This is the incentive
effect emphasized in this paper. The next Proposition shows that at the optimal
degree of risk sharing, denoted b∗, the latter effect always dominates.
Proposition 2 x (b)<0 for b = b∗.
Proof For an interior solution for b∗ we have  c (b∗) = 0 in Eq. 24 and from
−π (b)>0 it follows that φ f,b < 0 and hence x (b)<0. Non-existence of
corner solutions follows from Eq. 24:f o rb = 0, the second terms vanishes and
we have directly c (0)>0.F o rb = 1, the ﬁrst term vanishes because π (1) = 0.
Furthermore, x (b)<0 since because of π (1) = 0 there is no impact of b on x
through a reduced risk premium. Hence c (1)<0 and it follows with steadiness
of c (b∗) that 0 < b∗ < 1.    
As an immediate corollary of Proposition 2 we have that complete risk
sharing (b = 1) is never optimal. This is because at b = 1, the effect of a
marginal decrease in risk sharing on the risk premium is zero (i.e., π (1) = 0),
while there are still costs in terms of distorting production.
Corollary 1 Full risk sharing is never optimal.
We next parameterize the model. As costs arising from moral hazard are
inherently difﬁcult to quantify, the purpose is not to obtain an estimate of the
optimal degree of diversiﬁcation. Rather, the aim of the exercise is to study
whether there are plausible parameter values that would make a substantial
lack of risk sharing optimal. Moreover, and probably related, we are interested
in whether the costs of excessive risk sharing (that is risk sharing beyond
the optimal degree) could be large. Addressing these questions is crucial for
assessing the potential importance of our theory.
To this end we add more structure and assume that the production function
is given by f(x) = xα and that there are constant marginal costs z(x) = τx.
From Eq. 24 one can then derive an expression for b∗ that is deﬁned implicitly
by the parameters α, γ,σ2,σ∗2 and χ (the cost parameter τ drops out).7
We set the parameters as follows. α is the parameter that determines the
elasticity of output. Since φ f,b < 0 at b∗, a more elastic output (higher α)
increases the marginal cost of additional risk sharing (second term in Eq. 24)
and thus lowers b∗. We choose α to match empirical estimates for the output
elasticity of taxation.8 For this we assume that taxes are in the form of output
taxes. From Eq. 22 we obtain then a tax elasticity φ f,t =− α/(1 − α)(1 − t).
VedderandGallaway(1997)reviewstudiesofthemarginalcostofpublicfunds
7This is done by setting Eq. 24 to zero, substituting x (b) (which can be derived by differentiating
Eq. 22 with respect to b) and using π (b) =− γ(1 − b)σ2.
8Fixed factors (whose provision cannot be distorted) are thereby implicitly taken account of as
they lead to a lower elasticity estimate.592 W. Wagner
in the US and report a midpoint estimate of 40%. For an US tax-output ratio
of around 22%, this translates into φ f,t ≈− 3 and α ≈ 0.7. 9
The parameters γ,σ2 and σ∗2 are chosen to produce welfare gains from
international risk sharing consistent with previous literature. These welfare
gains have been computed in the absence of production distortions, i.e., when
χ = 0. We measure them by the ratio of the certainty equivalent of consump-
tion under full risk sharing and the certainty equivalent of consumption in the
absence of risk sharing, computed for the level of x that arises in the absence





f(x0)(1 − π1) − τx0
f(x0)(1 − π0) − τx0
(25)
where the subindexes 0 and 1 refer to no risk sharing and full risk sharing,
respectively. Using τ = (1 − π0) f (x0) (Eq. 22 for χ = 0)a n d f (x)x = αxα =
αf(x),E q .25 can be simpliﬁed to
gain =





2(σ2 + σ∗2) and π1 =
γ
2σ∗2.
We set the rate of risk aversion γ to 3 (which is the standard parameter
used in macroeconomics) and set the variance of output to σ∗2 = 0.01.W e
then choose σ2 to yield welfare gains of 3%, i.e., a gain of 1.03.11 Such gains are
at the upper end of estimates for the unexploited gains from international risk
sharing (as surveyed by Wincoop 1999).12
We cannot sensibly attach a value to the moral hazard parameter χ,a si ti sa
reduced form parameter. We will therefore present the results as a function of
χ. However, as discussed in the previous section, forces that mitigate moral
hazard are unlikely to be effective. Hence, although we cannot provide an
estimate for χ, we would expect its value to be signiﬁcantly above zero (which
is the value for which there are no moral hazard problems).
Figure 1 depicts the numerical solutions for b∗ as a function of χ.A st o
be expected, we have that the optimal degree of risk sharing is 1 when there
9The marginal cost of public funds is the marginal loss of consumption caused by a marginal
increase in tax revenues (under the assumption that tax revenues are returned to households,
i.e., c = f(x) − z(x)). Given tax revenues T = tf(x) and the household’s ﬁrst order condition
(1 − t) f (x) = z (x) (ignoring uncertainty here), the marginal cost of public funds is given by
MCPF =− c (T) =− ( f x (T) − z x (T)) =− tf x (T). Substituting x (T) in x (t) = x (T)T (t) =
x (T)( f + tf x (t)),solvingfor x (t)andplugging intoφ f,t = f x (t)/f gives φ f,t =− MCPF/(t(1 +
MCPF)).
10These are the so-called static welfare gains that most of the literature focuses on. They ignore
the impact of risk sharing on the level of production. We turn to such dynamic gains later in this
section.
11It turns out that, numerically, b∗ depends only on gain but not on its parameterization in terms
of σ2,σ∗2 and γ. Thus, although other combinations of σ2,σ∗2 and γ are plausible as well, this
would not affect the results.
12Unexploited gains refer to the welfare gains from moving from the actual degree of risk sharing
to full risk sharing. They thus understate the total gains from risk sharing. However, since the
extent of international risk sharing is low, the difference is likely to be negligible.International risk sharing and government moral hazard 593









Fig. 1 Optimal degree of international diversiﬁcation
are no incentive problems (i.e., b∗ = 1 for χ = 0). Furthermore, we also have
that b∗ decreases with χ. The main message from Fig. 1, however, is that the
optimal extent of diversiﬁcation is low for a wide range of χ. For example, for
a relatively modest χ of 0.2 it is about 20% and for a χ of 0.4 it is only 5%.
Figures 2 and 3 analyze the sensitivity of the optimal degree of risk sharing
with respect to the crucial parameters. Figure 2 depicts b∗ for different output
elasticitiesα (α = 0.3,0.5,0.7,0.9,correspondingtoproductionelasticitiesφ =
1/(1 − α) between 1.4 and 10) and Fig. 3 for different levels of gains from risk
sharing (1, 3 and 10%). As expected, increases in α and decreases in gain result
in a higher b∗. Moreover, the ﬁgures show that while b∗ is relatively robust
to changes in welfare gains, it is somewhat more sensitive to changes in the
elasticity parameter.
Figure 4 depicts the overall welfare gains (i.e., also taking into account the
costs of moral hazard) associated with different degrees of b (10, 25 and 50%)
asafunctionofχ.Welfareistherebymeasuredinunitsofcertaintyequivalents
of consumption, normalized to yield 1 in the absence of risk sharing. Figure 4
shows that for small χ modest gains arise. However, larger values of χ can
lead to substantial welfare losses. For example, 50% diversiﬁcation leads to a
welfare loss of 20% for a χ of 0.5.
Our calibration of the optimal degree of diversiﬁcation has only taken
account of the gains from risk sharing that arise directly from a reduction in
consumption variability. It has been pointed out that there are also indirect
gains because risk sharing can stimulate investment by reducing risk premia
in the economy. Higher investment, in turn, may lead to higher growth. Such594 W. Wagner













Fig. 2 Optimal degree of international diversiﬁcation: sensitivity to α
indirect gains have been shown to be potentially very important (e.g., Obstfeld
1994, ﬁnds indirect gains of up to 100%). Incorporating such indirect welfare
effects from changes in investment into our analysis is expected to reduce the
optimal degree of risk sharing b∗. This is because Proposition 2 shows that at
b∗ the impact of additional risk sharing on investment is negative (x (b)<0).
Hence, starting from b∗, a reduction in b is welfare improving if there are
additional welfare gains from increased investment. b∗ should, therefore, be
interpreted as an upper bound on the optimal degree of diversiﬁcation.13
5.1 Incentive problems and the low degree of international risk sharing
What are the implications of these results for the efﬁciency of the actual
degree of international diversiﬁcation? Sørensen and Yosha (1998) report that
only 5% of shocks to GDP are insured across OECD countries. According
to our preferred parameterization (Fig. 1), a χ of around 40% is required
in order for this to be optimal. An informal interpretation of χ = 0.4 is that
the representative input is to 40% chosen according to the government’s ﬁrst
order condition and to 60% efﬁciently. Hence, no implausibly high value for
χ is needed to make the actual degree of international risk sharing efﬁcient.
13Devereux and Smith (1994) have identiﬁed another channel through which international risk
sharing can affect welfare. It arises because international risk sharing reduces precautionary
savings, which can lead to lower human capital accumulation. This channel is independent of ours
and should, therefore, further lower the optimal degree of diversiﬁcation.International risk sharing and government moral hazard 595












Fig. 3 Optimal degree of international diversiﬁcation: sensitivity to gain
Given that b∗ is an upper bound on the optimal degree of international
diversiﬁcation and that the discussion in the previous section suggested that
χ may be rather large, it may even be that the actual degree of risk sharing
is excessive. Taken together, our simple parameterization hence suggests that
once potential moral hazard costs are taken into account, there is no reason to
believe that the currently observed degree of risk sharing is inefﬁciently low.
A different question though is whether our theory can also explain why
there is so little risk sharing across countries. As shown in Proposition 1,
insufﬁcient risk sharing incentives on the side of households do not form
an explanation. However, the absence of more complete international risk
sharing may be the result of governmentpolicies that aim at imposing a socially
efﬁcient degree of risk sharing. There are indeed several reasons that suggest a
signiﬁcant role for the government in determining risk sharing in the economy.
To start with, governments set the incentives for individual risk sharing.
They do this, for example, through their treatment of ﬁnancial investments
at home and abroad for tax purposes. Moreover, while we have focused so far
on risk sharing by households, governments also can (and do) carry out risk
sharing. In fact, in many respects governments have an advantage in dealing
with country-speciﬁc risks since they can make tailored contracts with other
governments or supranational organizations. Examples of such contracts are
the structural funds within the EU or international ﬁnancial aid orchestrated
by the IMF, which are both risk sharing devices. Furthermore, it has been
argued that risk sharing institutions are underprovided by the private sector
(Allen and Gale 1994; Shiller 1993). Hence, if governments do not provide596 W. Wagner































Fig. 4 Welfare effects of international diversiﬁcation
risk sharing (or implement institutions that allow for effective risk sharing),
this may not be compensated for through private risk sharing.
There is also evidence that is consistent with governments being reluctant
to facilitate international risk sharing. First, Sørensen and Yosha (1998) ﬁnd
that 92% of risk sharing within the OECD takes place on the individual
level, although various channels for government risk sharing are operative.
This is surprising given the fact that (as just discussed) governments should
have an advantage over households in providing risk sharing but could be
explained by their incentives to limit international risk sharing. Second, there
exist government-imposed frictions to international risk sharing that could be
justiﬁed as a mean of discouraging individual risk sharing. For example, the
current international tax system makes investment abroad disadvantageous.14
Third, there is also differential evidence consistent with this argument. If
the welfare costs of production distortions are important and governments
can indeed inﬂuence the extent of risk sharing in the economy, then we
would expect risk sharing to be greater across countries or jurisdictions where
distortions in government policies are less of an issue. This is likely to be
the case across US states because federal policies should not be distorted
by intra-state risk sharing (only state policies may be distorted). Moreover,
the common legal system may make it easier to deal with distortions at the
14This is, ﬁrst, because tax credits on foreign withholding taxes are usually imperfect (in particular
for capital gains). Second, governments effectively subsidize investment at home through dividend
imputation schemes.International risk sharing and government moral hazard 597
state level (for example, by acting as a commitment device). In support of
this prediction, Sørensen and Yosha ﬁnd that 60% of all shocks to income are
insured among US states, compared to only 5% among the OECD countries.
Furthermore, given that the problem of production distortions may be more
pronounced among OECD countries, we would expect OECD countries to
make relatively greater use of means of reducing consumption risk that do
not create production distortions. For example, intertemporal consumption
smoothing (through international borrowing and lending) reduces consump-
tion risk but does not distort production incentives since it does not require
insuring domestic income. Consistent with this, Sørensen and Yosha ﬁnd that
within the OECD 80% of reductions in consumption variability are due to
intertemporal consumption smoothing, compared to only 11% within the US.
6 Conclusions
Thispaperhasanalyzeddistortionsingovernmentpoliciesduetointernational
risk sharing. We have shown that the welfare costs from such distortions may
be very large. In particular, they can make a low degree of risk sharing across
countries actually desirable. As we have argued, the lack risk sharing across
countries may therefore be the result of government actions aiming at avoiding
excessive risk sharing.
Our analysis has further revealed a conﬂict between households’ incentives
for risk sharing and socially optimal risk sharing. Continuing ﬁnancial inno-
vation and integration may thus reduce welfare by limiting the government’s
ability to inﬂuence risk sharing in the economy, while, at the same time,
stimulating households’ risk sharing.
It should be emphasized that there are several mechanisms that could
potentially mitigate government moral hazard, such as the possibility for
the government to commit to future policies, reputational effects or the
international mobility of capital. Whether they are effective in constraining
distortions depends largely on what means of risk sharing are available. If
households have effective risk sharing instruments at their disposal, they can
insure their country in a variety of dimensions, which would limit the role of
these mechanisms.
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